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Comments
Expanding Third-Party Standing in
Custody Actions: How the Opioid
Crisis Has Impacted LGBTQ Parental
Rights in Pennsylvania
Jill C. Gorman*
ABSTRACT
Declared a public health emergency by the federal govern-
ment, the opioid crisis often places children in foster care when
parents fatally succumb to their addictions.  To unburden the fos-
ter care system and to accommodate family members who want
to care for these children, Pennsylvania enacted Act No. 21 on
July 3, 2018, to expand custody standing to include certain third
parties.  However, because the legislature has not expanded the
legal definition of “parent,” Act No. 21 poses a threat to the legal
rights of nonbiological LGBTQ parents.
This Comment begins by explaining how the opioid crisis
motivated the Pennsylvania legislature to amend the statute.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2020.  I have spent much of my life teaching and writing about concepts of
“family.”  Accordingly, I dedicate this Comment to Bill, Emily, Tom, Susan, and
my mother, Judy.  I also thank those at Dickinson Law School—my fellow clinic
members, my International Human Rights classmates, and my Room 120 commu-
nity—with whom I have collaborated and thought about how best to use the law to
empower others.
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This Comment then explores the negative ramifications of ex-
panded standing on LGBTQ families.  After examining the cur-
rent rights of LGBTQ parents in Pennsylvania, this Comment
demonstrates how the amendment impacts these rights.  Legal
scholars have analyzed how LGBTQ familial structures can be-
come increasingly vulnerable when the localized nature of family
law allows community morality to inform custody decisions.  This
Comment adds to this line of scholarship by placing the law
within the larger scholarly discussion about LGBTQ parental
rights.  This Comment finally concludes with two suggestions to
help protect LGBTQ parental rights:  statutory recognition of
“de facto parenthood” and offering proactive legal assistance to
low-income LGBTQ parents so they can memorialize their pa-
rental intentions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Opioid addiction currently stands as an overwhelming problem
within the United States.1  Officially declared a national epidemic
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2011 and a
public health emergency by the Trump Administration in 2017, the
opioid crisis often affects those with the greatest social and eco-
nomic disadvantage.2  The Institute for Research on Poverty sug-
gests that individuals from lower socioeconomic categories face a
greater risk of becoming addicted because “less-educated individu-
als face poor job prospects, flat or declining earnings and income,
and greater risk of workplace injuries, disability, and chronic health
conditions (which often lead to opioid prescriptions) . . . .”3  Over-
dose deaths from these prescribed opioids account for 40 percent of
the 91 overdose deaths per day in 2016.4  Those who no longer have
access to prescription opioids but still remain addicted often seek
out street drugs which often contain fentanyl, a synthetic opioid
that is 50 times more potent than heroin; deaths from fentanyl over-
doses increased 540 percent between 2014 and 2016.5
When parents face addiction and then either pursue treatment
or fatally succumb to the addiction, there are “substantial increases
in foster care placements, which have considerable cost implications
for states and the federal government.”6  To better provide healing
and stability for foster children, states must devote money to train
foster parents and to care for those children.7
The tragedy of and problems inherent to this opioid crisis have
hit Pennsylvania at one of the highest rates in the country.8  Penn-
sylvania amended its custody standing law in 2018 to allow certain
third-parties to file for custody, both to alleviate burdens on the
1. INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON,
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE (March 2018),
https://bit.ly/2TJvTxB [https://perma.cc/3T83-YQ7E].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Katie Wedell, Foster Care System Struggles to Keep Pace with Opioid Epi-
demic, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2tnUlci [https://perma
.cc/VEZ7-WQJB] (describing the foster care situation as a “double whammy—not
only are there more children entering foster care, but those children have more
costly needs”).
8. Dino Hazell, Bloomberg Announces $10 Million to Fight Opioid Epidemic
in Pennsylvania, THE MORNING CALL (Nov. 30, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://bit.ly/
2GV3zov [https://perma.cc/KKJ3-43ZH] (stating “Pennsylvania had the highest
number of drug overdose deaths in 2017 among all states . . .”).
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foster care system and to accommodate those family members who
want to care for children of addicted parents.9
This new standing provision creates certain vulnerabilities for
LGBTQ10 parents.11  Because the opioid crisis hits lower-income
populations at a higher rate,12 because lower-income populations
are more likely to remain unmarried,13 and because one parent
within a LGBTQ family is always and necessarily not a biological
parent to the child,14 the new statute threatens LGBTQ families.15
As the definition of “parent” stands under current Pennsylvania
law, the 2018 amendment to the custody standing provisions of Title
23, Section 5324 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes16 threat-
ens the parental rights of nonbiological LGBTQ parents in
nonmarital relationships.17
Attention to how the new legislation affects this segment of the
population is fundamentally necessary.  The U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include the funda-
mental right to parent.18  Courtney G. Joslin emphasizes the need
to think about the impact of new laws upon gay familial structures,
particularly nonmarital ones.19  Joslin states that the need for such
consideration is “true, even if the law was not designed or intended
to harm the group in question.”20  Because the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has interpreted the legal definition of “parent” in such
a way that some LGBTQ nonbiological parents fall outside its pro-
tection, the new expanded child custody law may infringe on those
nonbiological parents’ constitutional rights.21
9. Act of May 4, 2018, No. 21, 2018 Pa. Laws 112 (amending 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5324 (2018)).
10. The author has chosen to use the term “LGBTQ” because it is the term of
choice for the Human Rights Commission.  HRC Staff, HRC Officially Adopts Use
of “LGBTQ” to Reflect Diversity of Own Community, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(June 3, 2016), https://bit.ly/2Kply9o [https://perma.cc/RCR2-7AEQ].
11. Infra Part III.
12. Supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
13. Infra Part III.B.2.
14. Infra Part III.A.1.
15. Infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
16. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324 (2018).
17. Infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
18. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (discussing the right to raise
children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (discussing the right to have
children).
19. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage,
97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 472 (2017).
20. Id. (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 19 (2015)).
21. Infra Part III.
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Part II discusses the background of Act No. 21 (“Act 21”),22 an
Act conceived to meet a particular need—responding to the large
number of biological relatives who act as custodians over children
whose parents struggle with opioid addiction.23  Part III will analyze
the possible ramifications of Act 21 for LGBTQ parents who share
no biological connection with their children.24  It will first examine
the current legal rights of nonbiological parents within Penn-
sylvania.25  In order to better understand the evolution of these
rights, Part III will also examine key rulings pertaining to same-sex
parents in both marital and nonmarital relationships.26
This examination will demonstrate that the most secure legal
category for nonbiological parents is that of in loco parentis—ab-
sent an agreement both the biological and nonbiological parents ex-
ecute.27  The analysis will then examine the particular threat of Act
21 to nonbiological parents, given the nature of “family law local-
ism” and the “domestic relations exception,” the latter being the
idea that family law belongs to the state.28  Legal scholars have
pointed to family law as a site where community morality often in-
forms custody decisions.29  Joslin warns that this “greater tendency
to rely on explicit morals-based justifications in the family law con-
text is something that deserves greater consideration and analy-
sis.”30  This Comment will add to this line of scholarship by
analyzing the potential legislative intersection of two “moral” is-
sues—sexuality and drug use—as they present themselves in Act
21.31
Finally, this Comment will conclude with two suggestions to
protect low-income parents.  First, the Pennsylvania legislature
should adopt provisions of the 2017 version of the Uniform Parent-
age Act,32 especially its definition of a “de facto parent.”33  Second,
22. Act of May 4, 2018, No. 21, 2018 Pa. Laws 112 (amending 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5324 (2018).
23. Infra Part II.
24. Infra Part III.A.
25. Infra Part III.A.1.
26. Infra Part III.A.2–4.
27. Infra Part III.A.3 and Part III.A.4.
28. Infra Part III.B.1.
29. Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 623, 645 (2014).  For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.
30. Joslin, supra note 29, at 645.
31. Infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2.
32. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
33. Infra Part III.C.1.
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legal services should redirect some legal aid to proactively protect
parental rights of low-income couples.34
II. BACKGROUND
Act 21 amends Pennsylvania’s statutory requirements for
third-party standing in a custody action, granting standing in full
legal or physical custody cases where “[n]either parent has any form
of care and control of the child.”35  Act 21 specifies that the follow-
ing additional requirements must be met:  “(i) The individual has
assumed or is willing to assume responsibility for the child [and] (ii)
[t]he individual has a sustained, substantial[,] and sincere interest in
the welfare of the child.”36  Act 21 states that factors the court “may
consider” when evaluating the interest of the party in the child in-
clude “the nature, quality, extent and length of the involvement by
the individual in the child’s life.”37
While Section 5324 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
does not mention grandparents, its legislative history points to
grandparents as intended beneficiaries of the enacted statute.38  In
a memorandum introducing the legislation, Senator Donald White,
one of the Act’s co-sponsors, explained that amending Chapter 54
of the custody provisions within Title 23 would help “individuals/
relatives that are increasingly assuming the role of primary
caregivers due to the opioid and heroin epidemic in the Common-
wealth.”39  White wanted to assist relatives when “both parents are
absent (deceased or missing)” by providing a legal route for those
relatives to pursue custody.40
That legislators drafted the law to provide grandparents with
the right to assert standing becomes evident in White’s explanation.
White writes in his memorandum that legislation was necessary be-
cause, “although the grandparents had been involved throughout
the child’s life, they do not meet the current conditions under the
law to have the right to pursue custody.”41  Instead, “[i]ronically, a
34. Infra Part III.C.2.
35. Act of May 4, 2018, No. 21, 2018 Pa. Laws 112 (amending 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5324 (2018).
36. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(4)(i)–(ii) (2018).
37. Id. § 5324(4)(ii).  Act 21 indicates two instances in which the right to as-
sert third-party standing will not apply:  one, if dependency proceedings have com-
menced; and, two, if an order of permanent legal custody relating to disposition of
a dependent child already exists. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324 (2018).
38. Co-Sponsorship Memorandum from Pennsylvania Senator Donald C.
White (July 26, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Dyq535 [https://perma.cc/DT2Q-GBDG].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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third party (i.e. a boyfriend or girlfriend of a deceased parent) who
resided with the child and was acting in ‘loco parentis’ (performing
parental duties) would have the right to file for custody.”42
III. ANALYSIS
A. LGBTQ Nonbiological Parenting Rights Recognized by
Commonwealth Courts
Act 21 expanded standing to consider third-party intervention
by “an individual” inside or outside the household when “[n]either
parent has any form of care and control of the child.”43  The legisla-
tors passed this amendment to respond to the devastating toll of the
opioid crisis.44  Permitting individuals who demonstrate “a sus-
tained, substantial[,] and sincere interest”45 to assume custody of
children whose parents have succumbed to opioid addiction consti-
tutes both a morally and economically sound decision.46
However, Chapter 53 nowhere provides a legal definition of
“parent,” and courts have neither consistently recognized LGBTQ
nonbiological parents as parents nor consistently granted them
standing to pursue custody as third parties.47  Because at least one
parent in an LGBTQ household cannot be biologically related to
her child, the consequences of opening up third-party custody to
theoretically any party inside or outside the household, should the
legally-recognized parent no longer have any “care or control” of
the child, stands to wreak havoc on the stability within LGBTQ
households.48  To understand these ramifications, one must ex-
amine how Pennsylvania courts have traditionally viewed LGBTQ
parenting rights.
42. Id.  Literally, “in the place of the parent.” In loco parentis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th Ed. 2000).  For further discussion of in loco parentis, see infra
Part III.A.2 and Part III.A.3.
43. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(4)(iii) (2018).  Someone who is not recognized
as a “parent” of the child is considered a “third party” in custody litigation. Infra
Part III.A.4 and accompanying text.
44. Supra Part II.
45. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(4)(ii).
46. Supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
47. C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 898–900 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that, because
the statutory scheme provides no definition, the word must be understood in its
“popular and plain everyday sense”).
48. Infra Part III.A and III.B.
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1. Bases for Legal Parenthood: Biology, Adoption, or Contract
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently discussed the vari-
ous ways in which Pennsylvania legally defines a “parent.”49  In
C.G. v. J.H.,50 a female ex-partner of a biological mother petitioned
for standing to seek custody of a child born to the couple through
intrauterine insemination using an anonymous sperm donor.51  The
court cited Pennsylvania precedent establishing that the term par-
ent “plainly encompasses a biological mother and a biological fa-
ther and persons who attain custody through adoption.”52  Further,
the decision recognized that courts recognize nonbiological males
as parents through the doctrine of marital presumption.53  Addi-
tionally, the court acknowledged “the reality of the evolving con-
cept of what comprises a family”54 but applied this concept only
when the parental status was memorialized in an agreement be-
tween the parties.55  The court acknowledged that there exists a
“growing acceptance of alternative reproductive arrangements in
the Commonwealth”56 and that, if and when parental statuses be-
come memorialized in contracts, the courts should honor those
agreements.57
Accordingly, in C.G., which involved a biological mother who
used assistive reproductive technology (“ART”) but did not pro-
vide any rights to her partner, the court held that the nonbiological
mother “was not a party to a contract in connection with [the
c]hild’s birth.”58  In short, the court found that, where couples em-
49. C.G., 193 A.3d at 898–900.
50. Id. at 891.
51. Id. at 898–900.
52. Id. at 900 (citing J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).
53. Id. at 906.  The marital presumption states that a husband is the father of
any child born during the marriage and “embodies the fiction that regardless of
biology, the married people to whom the child was born are the parents . . . .”
K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 800 (Pa. 2012).  In C.G., the court referenced this
presumption when it stated that a “similarly-situated male based on cohabitation
in the absence of marriage” would not be accorded parental rights, either. C.G.,
193 A.3d. at 906. See also infra Part III.B.2.
54. C.G., 193 A.3d at 900 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 896.
56. Id. at 903 (“[T]he contract remains binding and enforceable.”) (citing Fer-
guson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007)).
57. Id. (“[I]t seems obvious that contracts regarding the parental status of the
biological contributors—whether one is an anonymous contributor or known to
the intended parent to the child be honored in order to prohibit restricting a per-
son’s reproductive options.”) (citing Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1247–48).
58. Id. at 901.  The court described assistive reproductive technology as those
births that involve “contracts involving surrogacy and/or the donation of sperm or
ova recognizing a separate mechanism by which legal parentage may be obtained
(or relinquished).” Id. at 905.
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ploy ART, there exists a “narrow judicial recognition of legal par-
entage by contract” wherein legal parent rights and responsibilities
have been “relinquished or assumed.”59  C.G.’s status as neither a
party to a contract nor an intended parent at the time of insemina-
tion was undisputed by the parties.60
The partner asserting parental rights argued that the court
should use an intent-based approach to determine parentage when
couples employ ART and that Vermont and Massachusetts should
use such an approach.61  However, the court stated that Penn-
sylvania has a much “narrower framework for establishing parent-
age in the absence of adoption, biology, or a presumption attendant
to marriage, and the facts of C.G.’s case do not fit into such a para-
digm.”62  Instead, in Pennsylvania, the “mere intention[ ] of two
people to be viewed as parents” is not grounds upon which one may
claim parental status.63  A concurring opinion stated that the court
might “expand the definition of parent” given a future case with
more persuasive facts about intent.64
2. Another Basis for Custodial Standing: In Loco Parentis
In C.G., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the request
of the biological mother’s ex-partner for standing sought under the
in loco parentis provision of Pennsylvania’s custody statute.65
Though it does not provide recognition of legal parenthood, it does
provide standing for a nonbiological LGBTQ parent.66
In T.B. v. L.R.M.,67 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described
in loco parentis as a legal status given to one “who puts oneself in
the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident
to the parental relationship without going through the formality of
a legal adoption.”68  Obtaining standing to bring a custody action in
this manner began in common law and was later codified in Chap-
ter 53.69  How one obtains in loco parentis status is not defined in
59. Id. at 904–05.
60. Id. at 904.
61. Id. at 905.
62. Id. at 906.
63. Id. at 904 n.11.
64. C.G., 193 A.3d at 913 (Dougherty, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 910–11 (majority opinion).  For the statute, see 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5324 (2018).
66. C.G., 193 A.3d at 910–11 (citing Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005)).
67. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
68. Id. at 916.
69. Id. at 918 (referencing common law).  For the statute, see 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5324 (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK104.txt unknown Seq: 10 25-OCT-19 14:25
160 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:151
that chapter; rather, the court conducts a fact-based analysis.70  The
person seeking such status must demonstrate that she discharged
parental duties and was granted parental “status,”71 both of which
conditions must have occurred with the consent of the biological
parent.72
Determining in loco parentis status provides a nonbiological
parent with standing,73 preventing a partner from erasing a parent-
child relationship “simply because after the parties’ separation[,
one parent] regret[s]” creating the relationship.74  In granting this
protection, a court recognizes “that the child’s best interest requires
that the third party be granted standing so as to have the opportu-
nity to litigate fully the issue of whether that relationship should be
maintained even over a natural parent’s objection.”75
LGBTQ nonbiological parents have tried to obtain standing
through in loco parentis with varied success.76  A petitioner must
demonstrate proof of essential facts to successfully posit such a rela-
tionship.77  Whether a court will find such status depends “upon the
particular facts of the case.”78  The fact that the in loco parentis
analyses “are necessarily fact-intensive and case-specific inquiries”
means that appellate courts defer to trial courts on questions of wit-
ness credibility absent an abuse of discretion.79  Credibility often
becomes dispositive in custody determinations; if a trial court finds
a witness credible, it will highly regard that testimony when deter-
70. T.B., 786 A.2d at 916–17.
71. Id.  The term “parental status” is used here, and one who gains this status
does obtain all the “rights and liabilities” equal to that between a parent and a
child. Id.  However, someone standing in loco parentis to a child still maintains a
third-party status, an equal footing as a non-parent in all primary physical custody
actions. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5327 (2018).
72. T.B., 786 A.2d at 919–20 (“What is relevant . . . is the method by which
the third party gained authority to [discharge parental duties].”).
73. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324 (2018).
74. T.B., 786 A.2d at 919 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996)).
75. C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 909 (Pa. 2018).
76. Compare id. (finding in loco parentis standing because biological parent’s
witnesses were judged more credible by the trial court when they stated biological
parent did not consent to assumption of parental duties by ex-partner), with T.B.,
786 A.2d at 916 (finding in loco parentis where partner shared daily child rearing
responsibilities with biological parent, co-owned the residence, and maintained ex-
clusive responsibility for child when biological mother was away).
77. T.B., 786 A.2d at 916.
78. J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1320.
79. C.G., 193 A.3d at 911 (“[W]e decline to foreclose a trial court from re-
viewing all relevant evidence in making this important determination that so
greatly will impact the family unit.”).
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mining the petitioner’s claimed parental relationship to the child,
and such determinations receive deferential treatment on appeals.80
But even this standing provides little advantage in the actual
custody hearing because, as third parties, nonbiological partners
must make a greater showing than the biological parent.81  Specifi-
cally, the custody statutory scheme affords to parents a rebuttable
presumption that the parent should receive primary physical cus-
tody over any third party, a presumption that only clear and con-
vincing evidence can overcome.82  Consequently, cases that appear
factually similar have resulted in quite different outcomes.83
In J.A.L. v. E.P.H.,84 the Superior Court found in loco parentis
status existed for J.A.L., the former domestic partner of the child’s
biological mother, E.P.H.85  Eight years into their relationship,
E.P.H. conceived a child through artificial insemination; ten months
after the child’s birth, she left J.A.L. and took the child.86
The court upheld the trial court’s determination that “docu-
ments executed by the parties before the child’s birth,” as well as
“E.P.H.’s conduct in giving the child J.A.L.’s surname as a middle
name on the birth certificate,” demonstrated that the biological
mother of the child intended for J.A.L. to act as a parent.87  The
documents drawn up included a guardianship agreement that nomi-
nated J.A.L. as guardian in the event of the death or disability of
E.P.H.; a medical consent form for the child that named J.A.L. as
an authorized party; and a co-parenting agreement that set forth
the couple’s intent to raise the child together, to share financial re-
sponsibility for the child, and for J.A.L. to become the de facto par-
ent of the child.88  J.A.L. had signed all but the last of these
documents.89
80. See, e.g., P.J.P. v. M.M., 185 A.3d 413, 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (“We
defer to the credibility determinations of the presiding trial judge, ‘who viewed and
assessed the witnesses first-hand.’”); Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 939–40 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (explaining that “the deference that this [appellate c]ourt must
give to the trial court’s determinations of credibility and resolutions of conflicting
evidence” in determining custody orders and that error can only be found if the
trial court exercised an “abuse of discretion”). See infra Part III.A.3.
81. C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 898 (Pa. 2018).
82. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5327 (2018).
83. Supra note 51 and accompanying text; see infra Part III.A.3.
84. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
85. Id. at 1322.
86. Id. at 1316–1317.
87. Id. at 1321.  E.P.H. changed the child’s legal middle name after E.P.H.’s
relationship with J.A.L. dissolved. Id. at 1317.
88. Id. at 1317.
89. Id.  She did not sign the third document because her attorney advised her
it would be unenforceable in Pennsylvania. Id.
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The court reasoned that these documents demonstrated that
the parties “took some pains to formalize [the] relationship to the
extent legally possible.”90  Further, the court found unpersuasive
the biological mother’s argument that her partner only lived with
the child for the first ten months of its life.91  The court articulated
that standing in loco parentis “creates a prima facie right sufficient
to grant standing to litigate custody.”92  A parent cannot erase this
right when “she voluntarily created and actively fostered” it simply
because, after separating, she “regretted having done so.”93
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also upheld the parenting
rights of an LGBTQ parent through in loco parentis in T.B. v.
L.R.M.94  T.B. and L.R.M. had an exclusive, intimate relationship,
shared finances and expenses, and decided that L.R.M. would be-
come pregnant using a sperm donor.95  T.B. attended the child’s
birth in the operating room, and the child referred to T.B. as “Aunt
T.”96  The partners did not enter into a formal parenting agreement,
but L.R.M. did name T.B. as the child’s guardian in her will.97
Three years later, when T.B. left the household to live with another
woman, L.R.M. refused all visitation requests, calls, and gifts for the
child from T.B.98
On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that T.B.
had earned standing to pursue custody through the doctrine of in
loco parentis.99  The court reasoned that T.B. made the necessary
showing that L.R.M. encouraged the relationship; and the court,
quoting J.A.L., held it could not remove the status of that relation-
ship simply because the biological mother “regretted having done
so.”100  In its decision, the court accepted the lower tribunal’s deter-
mination of the evidence’s credibility.101
90. Id. at 1321.
91. Id. at 1321–22.
92. Id. at 1319.
93. Id. at 1322.
94. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. 2001).
95. Id. at 915.  The sperm donor’s rights were terminated after the child was
born. Id. at 923.
96. Id. at 915.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 919.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 919.
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3. She Said, She Said: The Role of Credibility in the
Determination of In Loco Parentis
A nonbiological LGBTQ parent cannot assume that she will
receive the protection of in loco parentis status; because the higher
court usually defers to the credibility determinations of the trial
court, a set of facts in one case may not result in the same outcome
in another case with a similar set of facts.  In the recent case of C.G.
v. J.H.,102 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a former
partner did not stand in loco parentis to the child and, thus, did not
have standing to pursue custody.103  The parties differed as to
whether the biological mother had allowed C.G. to act as a parent;
the trial court ultimately found J.H. more credible, and the state’s
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, deferred to the trial court’s assess-
ment of credibility.104
Here, the couple lived together when J.H. conceived the child
with assistive reproductive technology using an anonymous sperm
donor.105  The birth certificate did not list C.G., a co-parenting
agreement did not exist, and the child did not bear C.G.’s name.106
Approximately five years after the child arrived, C.G. had an affair
and separated from J.H.107
The trial court found it significant that J.H. did not consult T.C.
when choosing a doctor, preschool activities, and making childcare
arrangements.108  According to J.H.’s witnesses, C.G. “occasionally
attended activities, appointments, and provided care,” a determina-
tion that led the trial court to determine that C.G. had discharged
no parental duties.109
In rebuttal, C.G. offered a note written by J.H. that referenced
the latter’s hope of “having a child together.”110  Further, C.G. tes-
tified that she still had the child listed as a beneficiary on a life
insurance policy.111  To support her argument that she had dis-
charged parental duties, C.G. testified that she carried both J.H.
and the child on her medical and dental insurance plans prior to
102. C.G. v. J. H., 193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018).
103. Id. at 909.
104. Id. See also id. at 918 (Wecht, J., concurring) (“[T]his case hinged upon
credibility findings . . . .  [W]e are bound on appellate review by the trial court’s
fact-finding and credibility determinations.”).
105. Id. at 893 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 896.
107. Id. at 894.
108. Id. at 896.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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separation.112  Further, C.G.’s parents testified that the child re-
ferred to them as “Grandma” and “Grandpa,” a fact the trial court
dismissed as “titles [that] were created for convenience rather than
demonstrating an actual familial bond or connection.”113
The trial court also did not afford weight to the testimony of
C.G.’s college-aged biological daughters, who vacationed with the
entire unit when they were together and testified that they consid-
ered these to be taken together “as a family.”114  Instead, the court
found J.H.’s witnesses more credible, such as J.H.’s friend, who tes-
tified that C.G. acted more like a “babysitter,” and that of J.H.’s
brother, who testified that “it was clear” C.G. had not wanted a
baby.115
In denying C.G. standing, the lower court reasoned that the
bond of third-party standing must not be formed “contrary to the
natural parent’s wishes.”116  The court distinguished the instant ac-
tion from J.A.L., where the court found parental intention in the
documents the parties executed117 and from T.B., where the biolog-
ical mother’s will listed the petitioner as the child’s guardian.118
Disregarding C.G.’s argument that the bond she formed with the
child should be determinative, the court reasoned that a bond can
be formed “contrary to the natural parent’s wishes” and that nor-
malizing such a rule would “undermine well-established principles
of in loco parentis analyses.”119  The purpose of such a fact-inten-
sive inquiry, the court reasoned, is to “protect the child and the
family from unnecessary intrusion by third parties.”120
4. LGBTQ Nonbiological Parents as Third-Party Litigants
To be sure, standing through in loco parentis provides a viable
option for nonbiological partners to seek custody upon the dissolu-
tion of LGBTQ relationships.  However, that the biological parent
receives primary deference in determining whether that in loco
parentis relationship exists cannot be overstated.121  In other words,
when the court determines whether standing exists, it defers to
112. C.G., 193 A.3d at 896.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 895.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 910.
117. Id. at 896 (citing J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996)).
118. Id. at 908.
119. Id. at 910.
120. Id. at 909.
121. Infra notes 146–175 and accompanying text.
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whether the biological parent consented to the third party’s pres-
ence in the child’s life; were the court not to defer accordingly, the
court would be interfering and intruding unconstitutionally in fam-
ily life.
Under the new statute, however, third parties receive standing
to interfere when neither parent has “any form of care and control
of the child.”122  Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in C.G.
restricted legal parenthood to the context of biology, adoption, or
where contractual clarity exists in specific ART cases,123 nonbio-
logical LGBTQ parents remain “third parties” who exist on equal
legal footing with any other third party who receives standing.124  If
the biological parent no longer exercises “care or control” of the
child, and the nonbiological LGBTQ finds herself in a custody ac-
tion with other parties, the amended custody standing statute places
all third parties with demonstrated interest and relationships with
the minor child on an equal footing.125
The statutory amendment expanding standing defers to the
fundamental right the Supreme Court recognized in Troxel; third
parties are not allowed to intervene unless no parent has care or
control of the child.126  However, given that Pennsylvania has such
a limited definition of “parent,”127 the potential for discriminatory
impact upon LGBTQ nonbiological parent/child relationships
exists.
The amendment provides standing to third parties beyond
those who may have an in loco parentis relationship with the
child.128  The third party who receives standing through in loco
parentis and any other third party demonstrating “a sustained, sub-
stantial[,] and sincere interest in the welfare of the child”129 stand as
equals in the eyes of the court and the state legislature.130  Unlike
the surviving biological parent in Troxel, the nonbiological parent
lacks comparable advantages.131  Absent the protection of ob-
122. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(4)(iii) (2018).
123. Supra Part III.A.3.
124. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5327(c) (2018) (“In any action regarding the cus-
tody of the child between a nonparent and another nonparent, there shall be no
presumption that custody should be awarded to a particular party.”).
125. Id.
126. 23 PA. C.S.A. § 5324.
127. Supra Part III.A.1.
128. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324 (2018).
129. Id. at § 5324(ii).
130. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5327 (2018).
131. Compare Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding a parent’s
right to raise her child exists as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment), with 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5324 (expanding standing from in loco parentis
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK104.txt unknown Seq: 16 25-OCT-19 14:25
166 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:151
taining parenthood through adoption or certain ART methods, that
nonbiological parent would face a direct threat to exercising her
own rights as a parent.  As the Supreme Court stated in Troxel, this
“liberty interest . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court,”132 an interest the amended stat-
ute puts at risk.133  Ultimately, the discretion of the trial court in
establishing credibility and determining whether an LGBTQ nonbi-
ological parent may retain custody of her child carries great
weight.134  It is the particular, localized nature of family law that
this Comment now examines.
B. The Localized Nature of Family Law and Its Effect on
LGBTQ Nonbiological Parenting Rights
1. The Domestic Exception and the Morals in Family Law
Localism
Uncertainty about parenting and custody issues can disrupt a
family’s sense of security.135  The discretionary power a judge holds
in adjudicating family law issues stems from the domestic-relations
exception, a jurisdictional doctrine that prohibits federal courts
from hearing family law cases.136  Consequently, family law adjudi-
cation “has been largely determined by the location of the parties”
within a state.137  Because the adjudication of family law issues var-
ies not only based on the county in which a case is heard but also
based on which judge in a given county hears the petitioner’s case,
the uncertainty is compounded.138  For example, the Troxel Court
noted that the trial judge awarded the grandparents partial custody
in part because he remembered the “enjoyable” summers he spent
as a child with his own grandparents.139
to any individual who demonstrates a “sustained, substantial[,] and sincere interest
in the welfare of the child”).
132. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
133. Infra Part III.B.
134. Supra Part III.A.3.
135. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127
YALE L. J. F. 589, 592 (2018).
136. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations
[is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States.”).
137. June Carbone, Marriage as a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the
Expressive Interest in Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49, 52 (2011).
138. Interview with Jan Rumsey, Attorney, North Penn Legal Servs., in
Towanda, Pa. (July 6, 2018) (explaining that judges in the same courthouse vary in
granting Protection From Abuse Orders—one judge may require a greater show-
ing of fear by the petitioner versus another judge who may see them as simple
manipulative attempts by the petitioner to evict the defendant from the home).
139. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000).
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As a result of the “belief—either conscious or unconscious—
that some interests are permissible in the family law context that
would be impermissible, or at least more questionable, in other con-
texts,” many family law opinions rely on “morality or community
norms.”140  The family law localism argument posits that courts
should take morality into account in rendering decisions because
states “are much closer to and more attuned to these local norms
that should and do inform the law.”141
Family law localism is evident in court decisions finding a
“nexus” between the morality of the parent and its determined neg-
ative effects on the child.142  Because the domestic-relations excep-
tion defers such judgment to local courts, “there is, at times, a belief
that state policymakers must be given greater latitude, or, some
may say, deference in order to achieve those goals.”143  Therefore,
there is a relationship between the morality of the court and the
morality of society.144
2. Nonmarital Discrimination
Family law does not treat marital and nonmarital couples
equally.145  For example, the marital presumption doctrine, opera-
ble in each state,146 provides a rebuttable presumption that a hus-
band is the father to any child the mother conceives during the
length of the marriage.147  There is no similar protection for
nonmarried couples, no matter the length of their cohabitation.148
Family law inadvertently creates stigma because law has an
“ability to influence social norms in the context of marriage, di-
vorce, [and] parenting . . . .”149  For example, the creation of no-
fault divorce laws has essentially removed the stigma that once
140. Joslin, supra note 29, at 637.
141. Id. at 639.
142. Id. at 643.
143. Id. at 647.
144. Given that voters elect county judges in Pennsylvania, this implicit con-
nection between the morals of a community and the decisions on the bench makes
political sense.  On the election of Commonwealth judges, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3131 (2018).
145. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015).
146. Pennsylvania does not have a statutory recognition of the marital pre-
sumption; it exists in case law. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 178–79 (1997).
147. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L. J. 2260, app.
A (2017).
148. Id. at 2344.
149. Solangel Maldonaldo, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimina-
tion Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 378 (2011).
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came with divorce.150  Custody standing laws stigmatize certain
groups, and “the failure to grant standing in certain cases inadver-
tently stigmatize[s] . . . nonmarital children.”151  Such stigmatization
will occur when LGBTQ nonbiological parents find themselves in
competition with those seeking custody under the amended stand-
ing statute.152  Because parents in nonmarital relationships are
often socioeconomically “non-elite,” this stigmatization of
nonmarital households becomes classist.153
The stigmatization is not helped by the negative, discrimina-
tory, and unwarranted views often associated with nonmarital
households.154  Almost half of Americans believe that an increase
in nonmarital births is the result of “[b]ad morals, a [b]reakdown in
family structure, [i]rresponsible/[c]areless behavior, or not taking
responsibility.”155  Further, society views unmarried mothers as
“sexually irresponsible, lazy[,] and unmotivated” and assumes they
will “rely on public assistance to support their children . . . .”156  The
legal system reinforces this negativity by depicting marriage as a
symbol of a meaningful family relationship.157  This mismatch de-
stabilizes “nonmarital families, affect[s] . . . the quality of parenting
. . . .  [It also] increases the stress and friction in a mother’s life, in
turn affecting the quality of her parenting.”158
150. Id. at 379.
151. Id.
152. Act 21 does not allow a third party to stand on equal footing with some-
one in loco parentis solely in custody cases when opioid addiction has affected the
legal parent(s).  23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324 (2018).  Instead, the presence of “no
parent” stands as the only requirement. Id.; see supra Part II.A.  Consequently,
the unintended consequences in a LGBTQ setting would occur when the biological
parent’s family members disagreed with the surviving child being raised with the
LGBTQ surviving parent.  Homophobic family members could easily take advan-
tage of the expanded third-party standing to disrupt LGBTQ families when a bio-
logical parent is no longer present.  The persistence of homophobia remains in
today’s society; for example, in a 2017 survey conducted by Harvard’s T.H. Chan
School of Public Health, more than 50 percent of those surveyed stated they had
experienced discrimination based on their sexual orientation. HARVARD T.H.
CHAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA, https://bit.ly/
2FLhcnf [https://perma.cc/373V-V4XG] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
153. June R. Carbone & Naomi R. Cahn, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of
Unintentional Parenthood, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511, 514 (2017).
154. Maldonaldo, supra note 149, at 369.
155. Id. at 370.
156. Id. at 371.
157. Huntington, supra note 145, at 178.
158. Id. at 185 (citing the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, which
examined the differences between marital and nonmarital children’s lives).  For
further information on that study, see PRINCETON UNIVERSITY AND COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, https://bit.ly/
2TfKLnc [https://perma.cc/5QVY-GK3R] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
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Lower-income couples are less likely to marry, to plan their
pregnancies, and to plan for the future by “memorializing their in-
tentions about parental rights and responsibilities.”159  Solutions ex-
ist, however, that the legislature could enact to alleviate any
unintended consequences of Act 21 upon LGBTQ parents.
C. Potential Solutions: Increased Legal Resources and Expanding
the Definition of “Parent”
1. Expanding the Definition of “Parent” Using the Uniform
Parentage Act
To alleviate the discrimination against nonmarital couples in
custody matters, some legal scholars recommend expanding the
definition of “parent.”160  For example, NeJaime suggests that
parenthood should be viewed as a “performative concept”—that
parentage recognition should expand beyond birth and genetics to
also include social factors, e.g., intent, function, and family forma-
tion—regardless of whether that family was institutionalized
through marriage.161
Extending the marital presumption to children born to same-
sex couples would protect married LGBTQ nonbiological par-
ents.162  While 11 states and the District of Columbia have statutory
gender-neutral marital presumptions, Pennsylvania does not.163
Arizona’s highest state court declared the marital presumption un-
constitutional because of its effect on same-sex couples, viewing the
presumption as “a grave and continuing harm” on these couples by
“demeaning them, humiliating and stigmatizing their children and
family units, and teaching society that they are inferior in important
respects.”164  NeJaime aptly suggests that, until the marital pre-
sumption is extended, courts should “view with skepticism a legal
159. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 153, at 514.
160. Huntington, supra note 145, at 173 (recommending “a new legal designa-
tion of ‘co-parent’ that underscores the enduring nature of parents’ connections to
each other through parenting”).
161. NeJaime, supra note 147, at 2338.
162. Id. at app. A.
163. Id.  In fact, Pennsylvania’s statutes still define marriage as “a civil con-
tract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.”  23
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2018).  Likewise, the statutes still provide that the Com-
monwealth will not recognize those same-sex marriages performed outside of its
borders.  23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2018).  To be sure, Pennsylvania recognized
same-sex marriage, but the legislature has yet to repeal the laws.  Whitewood v.
Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 424 (2014).
164. NeJaime, supra note 147, at 2600–02 (quoting McLaughlin v. Jones, 401
P.3d 492, 496 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.
Ct. 1165, (2018)).
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regime that forces nonbiological mothers, but not nonbiological fa-
thers, to adopt their children.”165
Another alternative to the current system that would benefit
both marital and nonmarital LGBTQ couples is extending the legal
concept of “paternity by estoppel” to “parentage by estoppel.”166
Recognized by many states, this theory grants recognition of par-
entage to one who has held the child out as her own after its
birth.167  Pennsylvania recognizes this concept for heterosexual
couples,168 but it has not had the occasion to do so for same-sex
couples.169  In C.G., a concurring opinion noted the unavailability
of this option for same-sex partners.170
In its decision in C.G., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that the facts presented did “not provide this Court with a factual
basis on which to further expand the definition of the term parent
under Section 5324(1).”171  Additionally, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Dougherty expressed concern about “the majority’s
cramped interpretation of ‘parent’ . . . the inevitable result of which
will be the continued infliction of disproportionate hardship on the
growing number of nontraditional families — particularly those of
same-sex couples . . . .”172  The majority, in contrast, postponed ex-
panding the definition of “parent,” choosing to wait for “another
case with different facts.”173  Given the judiciary’s seeming frustra-
tion with the current limited definition of parent under Penn-
sylvania’s case law, as well as its acknowledgement that the statute
165. Id. at 2356.  NeJaime further argues that the marital presumption and its
partial application to husbands but not to wives might constitute a “sex-based”
classification that would be unconstitutional under United States v. Virginia, 581
U.S. 515 (1996). Id. at 2353.  Laws affecting marital status receive rational basis
review. See Peter Nicolas, Gayffirmative Action: The Constitutionality of Sexual
Orientation-Based Affirmative Action Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 768–69
(2015).
166. The term “paternity by estoppel” most often applies in child support ac-
tions when the court holds a man responsible for paying support if he has previ-
ously held the child out as his own. See K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 810 (Pa.
2012) (holding “paternity by estoppel” applies when it is in the best interests of the
child).  “Parentage by estoppel” would operate so that one parent could not deny
that another parent has acted in that capacity.  June Carbone and Naomi Cahn,
Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 87–88 (2016).
167. Carbone and Cahn, supra note 166, at 88.
168. Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532–33 (Pa. 1995); M.L. v.
J.G.M., 132 A.3d 1005, 1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
169. C.G. v. J. H., 193 A.3d 891, 917 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 906 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 911 (Dougherty, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 904, n.11.
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provides no definition of parent, the legislature would do well to
revise the definition of “parent” within the Child Custody Act.
Possible legislative solutions include incorporating legislation
from the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).174  First published in 1973,
the UPA aims to provide “well-conceived and well-drafted legisla-
tion” to “help states address newly emerging issues.”175  It was
amended in 2017 specifically to help address parenting issues re-
lated to same-sex couples.176  For relationships that form after the
child is born, the UPA created a “de facto” parenthood status that
is granted parity with other legal parents, including genetic par-
ents.177  Another provision provides that, when multiple petitioners
seek recognition as parent, courts must make a fact-based analysis,
including the length of time during which each individual assumed
the role of parent, the nature of the parent-child relationship, and
the harm to the child if that relationship was not recognized.178  Fi-
nally, the UPA provides for a gender-neutral definition of the mari-
tal presumption.179
2. Legal Help for Nonmarital LGBTQ Parents
Implementing these provisions would be a proactive solution
to some of the problems that Act 21 causes LGBTQ parents.180
June Carbone indicates that parental groups from lower socioeco-
nomic classes exist more commonly in nonmarital relationships and
create written documents codifying their intentions about parenting
rights and responsibilities less frequently.181  Additionally, such
groups are “less likely to . . . know what the law is . . . . have the
means to use it to advance their own purposes even if they are fa-
miliar with the law,” and less likely to “face judges who will under-
stand and apply the norms of their communities.”182  Accordingly,
legal aid or other pro bono initiatives can offer free services so that
nonmarital couples can act to protect themselves and their families
from potential custody battles when the biological parent no longer
exercises care or control over the child.
174. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).  For its use in
legislation, see Joslin, supra note 29, at 592.
175. Joslin, supra note 29, at 592.
176. Id. at 599.
177. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
178. Id. § 613.
179. Id. § 609.
180. Supra Part III.A. and Part III.B.
181. Carbone, supra note 137, at 52.
182. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 153, at 514.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-1\DIK104.txt unknown Seq: 22 25-OCT-19 14:25
172 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:151
Offering discounted legal educational and drafting services
would help alleviate the stress, uncertainty, and potential court
struggles LGBTQ families might face when the biological parent no
longer has care or control over the child.183  Because the courts rec-
ognize custody and guardianship agreements,184 pro se clinics de-
voted to creating these agreements would help LGBTQ parents
memorialize their custodial intentions.  To be sure, the legal aid sys-
tem is underfunded, and providing these services would cost
money.185  However, providing these proactive services would cost
far less than providing an attorney in a future custody battle.186
Another way that legal aid or pro bono services could assist is
by offering limited counsel to LGBTQ couples whose relationships
dissolve.  For example, Clare Huntington suggests alternative dis-
pute resolution structures should exist at discounted rates for un-
married parents to ease the transition into co-parenting after
relationships dissolve.187
IV. CONCLUSION
In passing Act 21 of 2018, legislators met a demonstrated need
that the opioid epidemic in Pennsylvania caused.188  Extending
third-party custody to individuals outside the immediate family in
Pennsylvania enables more children to avoid foster homes and en-
joy a more consistent home environment.189  To be sure, given the
rising incidence of multi-generational addiction that has plagued
other states, family members cannot always assume custody; to that
183. Legal aid websites offer some limited, generic online assistance to
couples; for example, the best legal site offering self-help custody information and
forms specific to Pennsylvania is PALawHelp.org. PALAWHELP.ORG, https://
bit.ly/2touj8P [https://perma.cc/6JNG-B4ZN] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).  However,
there are no sample guardianship or custody agreement forms on this site. Id.
Further, as helpful as these resources are, they do not provide guidance specific to
the needs of LGBTQ couples, nor could couples be certain that the document they
would create on their own would be legally sufficient and effective to stand up in
court.
184. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
185. Douglas Grant, Legal Aid Services Are Being Starved, THE NATION
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/2N27wIP [https://perma.cc/WSL9-RM27].
186. The time and resources an attorney would use to prepare these docu-
ments—duties that a paralegal could share, such as meeting with the client, prepar-
ing the forms, and executing them—would be much less than the resources used to
fight a custody battle, such as pleading preparation, brief writing, and hearing par-
ticipation time, which the attorney must usually bear alone.
187. Huntington, supra note 145, at 174.
188. Supra Part I and Part II.
189. Supra Part I and Part II.
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end, Pennsylvania has created a valuable solution for those children
with opioid-addicted parents.190
Offering proactive services to help LGBTQ parents costs less
than a custody battle, both economically and emotionally.191  Penn-
sylvania’s governing bodies swiftly amended standing requirements
to respond to concern about children who lose their parents in the
opioid crisis.192  Likewise, concern about protecting children in
LGBT families left vulnerable by the amendment should drive the
implementation of the solutions described in this Comment.
190. On multi-generational addiction’s preventing family members from as-
suming custody in Ohio, see Wedell, supra note 7 (stating that placing children
with family members has become “more difficult”).
191. On the emotional and financial costs of custody battles, see Katie Bur-
ford, Custody Battles Drain Accounts, Emotions, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 7, 2004),
https://bit.ly/2DNL3Ly [https://perma.cc/RN3M-M45H].
192. Supra Part I and Part II.
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